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TRANSITING THE SEAS OF CYBERSPACE

APPLYING THE

1

LAW OF NEUTRALITY

WHILE TRANSITING THE SEAS OF CYBERSPACE

DANIELLE HIGSON*

Neutrality, in popular thought, means keeping out ofwar. It is the condition of those who remain
at peace while others are fighting. In this sense, the problem ofneutrality is as old as war itself
From a more technical point of view, this is scarcely true because in its modern meaning
"neutrality" is a legal status involving certain rights and duties. It therefore contemplates
the existence ofsome sort ofinternational legal system. 1

l.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike the physical domains ofland, sea, air, and outer space, the new man-made domain
of cyberspace cannot be seen or felt for it "is not a physical place - it defies measurement in any
physical dimension or time-space continuum." 2 Since its creation by man, cyberspace has greatly
expanded the interconnectivity of the world. "Today, cyberspace is seamless and transcends
international boundaries at the speed oflight." 3 It has led to advancements in all areas oflife. At the
same time, however, cyberspace creates great new vulnerabilities, which have the potential to disrupt
peace and stability in the world. 4
Although cyberspace has existed for the last several decades, there are still no international
rules, much less standard definitions applicable to this new domain. 5 Utilizing cyber operations or
' CDR Danielle Higson is the Director of the Cyber, Information Operations, and Intelligence Law Division of the
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. She received her B.A. from Johns Hopkins University, her JD. from
the University of Virginia School of Law, and her L.L.M. in International and Operational Law specializing in Cyber
Law from the United States Army Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS). The views expressed
in this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the United States government.
1
See PHILIP C. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY: ITs HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAw, VOLUME IV: TODAY AND TOMORROW 3 (I976).
2
See WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE I5 (I999) (noting nothing exists in cyberspace,
rather, it either exists on a computer or is in transit within a telecommunications infrastructure).
3
See Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F.
L. REv. 65, 66 (2009).
4
See Jonathan]. Frampton, Achieving National Unity ofEffort in Cyber, 2-3, 5 (Jun. 16, 2011) (unpublished Master's
thesis, Air Force Institute ofTechnology Graduate School of Engineering & Management) (on file with author), http://
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545358 (explaining that cyber creates a wide number of capabilities for
threats against military systems beyond kinetic strikes that include, but are not limited to, covert communications, space
system threats, multi-static radars, and more).
5 See Paul A. Matus, Strategic Impact o/Cyber Warfare Rules for the United States, 1, 5, 10 (Mar. 25, 2010) (unpublished
paper) (on file with United States Army War College), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522001.
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"[d]etermining a response to a particular Cyber event is challenging in the current international
environment." 6 In creating theory and policy, it is essential that there is a meeting of the minds on
the terms and definitions. 7 Among the differing definitions of cyberspace, 8 the United States Department of Defense (DoD) defines cyberspace as "[a] global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." 9
Although DoD has a definition of cyberspace, it is at times paralyzed in conducting cyber
operations due to a lack of any international agreement or even understanding on the application
of sovereignty, the law of armed conflict, and neutrality in cyberspace. 10 "[M] ilitary strategists argue
that these uncertainties have led to excess caution on the part of Pentagon planners" who are "tremendously sensitive to collateral damage by virtual weapons, but not nearly sensitive enough to damage by kinetic" ones. 11 In October 2011, the New York Times reported that the United States debated using cyber warfare to open the campaign against Libya in March 2011, but rejected its usage in
favor of kinetic strikes. 12 In speculating on the reason behind the decision not to use cyber warfare,
the article mentions "potential legal complications." 13 One of the impediments may have been a fear
6

Frampton, supra note 4, at 13 (stating the United Nations Charter defines terms such as, an act of aggression, threat of
use of force, and an armed attack in the context of]us Ad Bellum but are silent on their application in a cyber context).
7
See generally MARK WESTON ]ANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAw OF NATIONS I776-I939 I-2 (20rn) (arguing the law
referred to as the law of nations or international law has not meant the same thing to everyone, causing fierce debates
in America over international law when in reality the two sides were actually arguing over different things); Ryan T.
Kaminski, Escaping the Cyber State ofNature: Cyber Deterrence and International Institutions, CONFERENCE ON CYBER
CONFLICT PROCEEDINGS 2010, 79, 84-85 (Christian Czosseck & Karlis Podins eds., 2010), https://ccdcoe.org/sites/
default/files/multimedia/pdf/Kaminski%20-%20Escaping%20the%20Cyber%20State%20of%20Nature%20Cyber%20
deterrence%20and%201nternational%20Institutions.pd£ Kaminski%20%20Escaping%20the%20Cyber%20State%20
of%20Nature%20deterrence%20and%201nternational%20Institutions.pdf (arguing that a lack of a generally accepted
vocabulary in cyberspace can cause international law to be inconsistently interpreted leading to different reactions to the
same cyber incident).
8
Christian L. Basballe Sorensen, Cyber OODA: Towards a Conceptual Cyberspace Framework, 10 (Jun. 1, 2010)
(unpublished thesis, Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) (on file with author), http://www.dtic.
mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA53695 l (noting definitions pertaining to cyberspace vary across organizations and
authors).
9
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JornT PuB. I-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND AssocIATED TERMS 58 (Nov. 8, 2010).
10
See David E. Sanger et al., CYBERWAR; U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?ref=topics&_r=0 (explaining that the lack of articulation of a
clear strategy and secrecy regarding the development of cyber weapons and the like hinders national debate); Duncan
B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. rn23, rn53 (2007)
(arguing that the uncertainty, insufficiency, and complexity of international law for cyber operations causes a disincentive
for using cyber operations in favor of traditional use of force).
11
John Markoff & Thom Shanker, Halted '03 Iraq Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear o/Cyberwar Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber.html (partially quoting John Arquilla) (hinting that collateral
damage to innocent third parties is a concerning potential repercussion of cyberwarfare).
12
Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfore in Attack Plan on Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html (explaining the
cyberoffensive tactic was meant to disrupt and potentially disable the Qaddafi government's air-defense system).
13
Id. (citing that one of which would be a question of whether the United States' military strike against the Libya airdefense system might create domestic legal restrictions pursuant to the War Powers Resolution).
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of violating the neutrality of a State such as Switzerland whose cyberspace the cyber weapons could
have uncontrollably passed through in route to Libya.
Of the many types of actions (social, economic, political) that are conducted in cyberspace,
this paper focuses on those activities involved in cyber warfare. It "is essentially the use of networks
and control systems to carry out organized disruptive, disabling, destructive or malicious attacks." 14
"Cyber warfare can be used to describe various aspects of defending and attacking information and
computer networks in cyberspace, as well as denying an adversary's ability to do the same." 15 Critical
to any discussion of cyber warfare is the definition of a cyber weapon, since these instruments of destruction do not resemble traditional means of warfare. One proposal for a definition of a cyberspace
weapon is "[a] ny capability, device, or combination of capabilities and techniques, which if used for
its intended purpose, is likely to impair the integrity or availability of data, a program, or information located on a computer or information processing system." 16 At least 140 States have programs
to develop cyber weapons. 17 Cyber warfare has to be distinguished from cyber attacks, because not
all attacks are cyber warfare. 18 ''A cyber attack is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to a wide
variety of ends, from propaganda to espionage, from denial of service to the destruction of critical
infrastructure." 19 This paper defines cyber warfare as cyber attacks between belligerents in an international armed conflict in cyberspace. 20
14

John Weed, Cyber Warfare: Understanding the Threat to Weapon Systems, 9 WEAPON SYSTEMS TECH. INFO. ANALYSIS
Cm. Q. 2, 2 (2010), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520062.pdf (defining cyber warfare as including tactics
such as, disrupting military forces through disabling communication, gaining access to secure networks through hiding
malicious code in computer chips, and breaching critical infrastructure).
15
STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30735, CYBERWARFARE i (2001) (focusing on the difficulty of
determining the source of a cyber attack as a major concern).
16
See Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare With an Asymmetric Definition, 64
A.F. L. REv. 65, 83 (2009).
17
See Arie]. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REv. 121, 134
(2009).
18
"Overbroad use of the terms 'cyber attack' and 'cyber warfare' and a failure to clearly define the various cyber
capabilities also creates problems for the development of policy and doctrine for the use of these capabilities, as well as
adding difficulty in developing a response to such activities." See Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use ofForce in Cyber
Space: The Application ofthe Law ofArmed Conflict During a Time ofFundamental Change in the Nature ofWarfare, 60
NAVAL L. REv. r, 4 (2010) (making a distinction that most cyber intrusions occurring every day to United States systems
are not part of some broader cyber warfare campaign even though these intrusions are regularly referred to as cyber
attacks); ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IOI (2010) (arguing for a
terminology review, because of the confusion being caused by referring to all cyber attacks as either cyber war or cyber
terrorism are misleading without analyzing the facts through the relevant legal frameworks).
19 KENNETH GEERS, STRATEGIC CYBER SECURITY 9 (2on) (stating the Internet has created a new delivery mechanism for
threats to national security).
20
The UN Charter provides the contemporary rules ofjus ad bellum, the principles of just war. See U.N. Charter art.
2. In Article 2(4), it outlaws the "use of force" against another State. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. In a situation where
the "use of force" amounts to an "armed attack," Article 51 allows a State to legally respond in self-defense with force. See
U.N. Charter art. 51. If the State responds with force against the other State, there will be an international armed conflict
as referred to in Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions and a state of war as referred to in the Hague Conventions. See
U.N. Charter art. 2. In this paper, international armed conflict and war are used synonymously. See YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 9-15 (3d ed. 2001); Sean Kanuck, Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under
International Law, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1571, 1585-90 (2010).
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Until recently, many believed in the impossibility of regulating cyberspace, because of the
speed at which it transcends national boundaries. However, States have slowly began developing
domestic criminal laws to regulate the conduct of its citizenry on the Internet, leading to the realization that it is not a borderless wild frontier. With this awareness, the international community must
decide how States will define, exert, and defend their sovereignty in cyberspace, while still preserving
the utility of the Internet for cyber travelers. Although many, including the developers of the Internet, argued that government should stay out of cyberspace, sovereignty is essential in order to control
the chaos inherent in any environment where people have total freedom to do their will.
It will be difficult to garner international support for any new regime to standardize conduct
globally in cyberspace, since there is very little agreement amongst States on how cyberspace should
be regulated. 21 The only treaty thus far to police cross-border Internet harm is the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, which is widely viewed as unsuccessful. 22 In order to try to get most
nations to ratify the treaty, it utilizes vague definitions that are open to multiple interpretations. 23 Yet
only two-thirds of the Council of Europe and the United States have ratified it. 24 Given this situation, we need to extrapolate what we can from the existing body of international law so that State
action will create the customary international law of cyberspace. In its Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace, the United States DoD proposes that "[c]ontinued international engagement, collective
self-defense, and the establishment of international cyberspace norms will serve to strengthen cyberspace for the benefit of all." 25 While the current international law does not directly address cyberspace, States can apply the principles of international law.
Over the last two decades, there has been a great deal of scholarship on the application of
the law of armed conflict to cyberspace. Cyberwar has been accepted as a real possibility. With this
acceptance, there has been some limited discussion on how to treat neutrality in cyberspace. What
obligations does a neutral State have to remain neutral in a cyberwar? What does international law
require of a belligerent in regard to a neutral State? Some scholars have warned if the United States
is not careful, it could unintentionally abandon its neutral status. 26 A misguided view of the law of
21

See Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAw
5-7 (Peter Berkowitz ed. 2011), http://media.hoover.org/ sites/default/ files/ documents/FutureChallenges_Goldsmith.
pdf; Charles]. Dunlap Jr., Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar, 5 STRATEGIC STUDIES Q. 81, 83 (2011),
http://www.au.afmil/au/ssq/2011/spring/dunlap.pdf; Toby L. Friesen, Resolving Tomorrow's Conflicts Today: How
New Developments Within the U.N Security Council Can Be Used to Combat Cyberwarfore, 58 NAVAL L. REv. 89, 107
(2009) (suggesting that because of the high likelihood of a cyber conflict occurring before the time an international
treaty or customary law on cyberspace is developed, that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 should be applied to
cyberwarfare).
22
Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 3-4 (mandating signatory nations adopt legislation banning cybercrimes such as illegal
access and interception of data, intellectual property offenses, data and system interference, among others).
23
Id. at 4 (conceding that convention lacks enforcement mechanisms resulting in signatories flouting or ignoring
provisions).
24
Id. (referencing the significant hold-out member states are Belgium, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Russian,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom).
25
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 2 (2011).
26
Stephen W Korns & Joshua E. Kastenberg, Georgia's Cyber Left Hook, 38 PARAMETERS 60, 71-73 (2008) (identifying
the July 2008 DDoS attack against Georgia as a cybercrime, but the following DDoS attack in August 2008 as an act
of cyber war, which resulted in the withdrawal of the United States from Georgia's support in order to remain neutral);

Vol. 6, No. 2

TRANSITING THE SEAS OF CYBERSPACE

5

neutrality should not, however, impair a State's ability to act in cyberspace or to limit its assistance to
other states during a cyber crisis.
A fear of violating the law of neutrality should not discourage States from utilizing offensive
cyber operations, "a range of potential activities that [can] be aimed at foreign computer systems:
from straight intelligence collection ... , to counterintelligence operations ... , to covert actions
conducted abroad ... , to cyberwarfare." 27 If wars are still going to occur despite the United Nations
(UN) Charter, cyberwarfare offers the possibility of defeating the enemy with less loss of human life
and physical damages than kinetic warfare. 28
''A cyber-only victory could facilitate post-war diplomacy, economic recovery, and
reconciliation." 29 One possible example is the Stuxnet computer worm launched by an unidentified
source against Iran's nuclear centrifuges in 2010. 30 It appears Stuxnet sole mission was "to attack and
destroy as many of the Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges as possible thereby directly slowing
down the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme." 31 At the Natanz nuclear research establishment, it damaged approximately 1,000 centrifuges used for Uranium enrichment. 32 "Stuxnet may
have been more effective than a conventional military attack and may have avoided a major international crisis over collateral damage." 33 In addition, States should not fail to aid another State in a
cyber crisis out of an apprehension of losing its neutral status.
Once thought to be borderless and free of government control, States are transforming cyberspace by exerting their sovereignty in this new domain. Given the unique nature and purpose of cyberspace, a right to "transit passage" is necessary for the continued functionality of the Internet as we
know it. As sovereignty is recognized in cyberspace, there is concern about violating another State's
neutrality. Only international armed conflict, however, triggers the law of neutrality. Therefore, a fear
of violating neutrality should restrict actions in cyberspace only in the limited circumstances of an
international armed conflict. In these circumstances, international law should acknowledge that the
law of neutrality is not violated by packets merely transiting through a neutral State.
In the following sections, this paper will discuss the Internet, sovereignty, the law of armed
conflict, the law of neutrality, and the 2008 cyber attacks of Georgia. Part II describes the developJoshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REv. 43, 44 (2008) (acknowledging compelling reasons to remain neutral include limiting
damage of warfare to warring states and commercial losses due to conflict).
27
Steven G. Bradbury, Partner, Dechert, LLP., Keynote Address at the Harvard National Security Journal Symposium:
The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations (Mar. 4, 20n), http://harvardnsj.org/
wp-content/uploads/201 l/04/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final.pdf.
28
See JeffreyT.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles ofDistinction and
Neutrality in the Age ofCyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1427, 1447 (2008).
29
GEERS, supra note 19, at 13 (articulating that cyber attacks could be key for future wars and victory can be achieved
prior to combat).
30
Id. at 13 (doubting that a cyber attack similar to Stuxnet will occur often as modern critical infrastructure poses many
problems because of its complexity); see also Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 12 (explaining Stuxnet was a computer worm
that prevented an Iranian nuclear power plant from producing nuclear fuel).
31
DR. K, THE REAL HACKERS' HANDBOOK 247 (4th ed. 2011).
32
Id. at 246.
33
GEERS, supra note 19, at 13 (arguing that the code used to deploy Stuxnet efficiently solved what five years ofU.N.
Security Council resolutions could not have done, which was to disrupt Iran from creating a nuclear bomb).
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ment, structure, and importance of the Internet, which is necessary background for deciding how
to apply sovereignty in cyberspace. Part III explores how the international community should treat
sovereignty in cyberspace and argues for the adoption of a regime of "transit passage." Part IV looks
at the relevance of the law of armed conflict in cyberspace. Part V contends that the law of neutrality only applies in cyberspace in the limited circumstances that the law of armed conflict is triggered.
In those situations, it maintains that the Hague Conventions provide for the transit of electrons
through cyberspace without violating neutrality. Part VI wraps up analyzing how States did not lose
neutral status by assisting Georgia in 2008 during its cyber crisis. Before looking at how sovereignty
and the law of neutrality apply in cyberspace, it is important to understand the structure and value of
the Internet.

II. THE CENTERPIECE OF CYBERSPACE - THE INTERNET

"The Net negates geometry. While it does have a definite topology of computational nodes
and radiating boulevards for bits, and while the locations of the nodes and links can be plotted
on plans to produce surprisingly Haussmann-like diagrams, it is fundamentally and profoundly
antispatial." 34 It is not a definable or describable place. Yet, one can find things within the Internet
that one did not know existed nor where they were located. 35 "The Net is ambient - nowhere in
particular but everywhere at once." 36 One can access the Internet by logging on from wherever one
is physically located, 37 placing oneself virtually in cyberspace while simultaneously remaining in the
territorial sovereign of where one began the journey. While virtually exploring cyberspace, one seamlessly transcends into and across the cyberspace of other States. These unique characteristics pose a
challenge for sovereignty. Although the Internet is only a subset of cyberspace, this paper primarily
concentrates on the Internet in exploring how to create a regime for sovereignty in cyberspace. This
section examines the characteristics of the Internet that will impact the choice of a regime.

A. The Birth ofthe Internet
In the interest of National Security, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) provided the funding and institutional support for the research that led to the development of the Internet. 38 Despite DoD's motives, the aspirations and vision of a unique group of electrical engineers and
unorthodox computer programmers, who desired to redesign the way computers worked in order to
amplify human thinking and communication, designed the Internet. 39 Desiring to keep the Inter-

34
35
36
37

WILLIAM]. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS

8 (1995).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.

c. HANSON, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS 57 (2008).

38

ELIZABETH

39

Id. (reasoning that DoD originally wanted to create a computer network that could survive a nuclear attack but began

the creation of something much bigger).
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net free from government, these founders built a system of decentralized control. 40 "In effect, they
built strains of American libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the
Internet." 41
This DoD computer research program was in the Advanced Projects Research Agency
(ARPA). 42 J.C. R. Licklider, a psychologist at MIT, headed the program. 43 The DoD created ARPA
with a broad mandate to fund cutting-edge research and strategically placed the Agency directly
below the Secretary of Defense. 44 "Throughout the 1960s groups at various universities and research
centers were funded to work on different aspects of interactive computing and networking." 45 First,
the research focused on enabling users to interact with a computer through a terminal, which then
turned to connecting computers in different geographic locations to enable them to collaborate and
share materials. 46 In 1965, the researchers linked a computer in Massachusetts to one in California
through a telephone network, but large blocks of data caused problems when they created traffic
jams.47 A packet-switching network, which "allows for faster travel speeds, a higher volume of information, and permits the system to withstand additional stresses,'' 48 still utilized today, turned out to
be the solution. 49
In the fall of 1969 at UCLA, the first computer network, ARPANET, was born. 50 It was
deliberately designed with "a distributed, redundant structure so that it could survive partial nuclear
destruction and the knockout of military headquarters." 51 By the end of that year, four host computers connected approximately one thousand researchers around the country. 52 The network got
bigger and bigger and was utilized more for sending messages than its original purpose of sharing
expensive resources among the different research centers. 53 In 1975, the military became interested in
the network and began using it for communication. 54 In 1982, the network was split into MILNET,
40

]ACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?, ILLUSIONS OF BoRDERLESS WORLD 23 (2006)
(referring to the structure of the Internet's design as open, minimalist, and neutral because it is willing to accept any time
of computer or network to join, does not require much of the computers or networks to join, and treats all applications
the same).
41
42

Id.

HANSON, supra note 38 at 57.
HANSON, supra note 38 at 57.
44
HANSON, supra note 38 at 58 (commenting the design was to ensure the project would be independent of pressures
from individual services for specific projects).
45
See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58 (asserting that there was interest throughout the United States of people who were
eager to reinvent computing).
46
See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58.
47
See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58.
48
See Sharon R. Stevens, Internet war Crimes Tribunals and Security in an Interconnected World, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 657, 659 (2009) (citing ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE 6o-6I (2007)).
49
HANSON, supra note 38, at 58 (designing the system to distribute messages by breaking them up into individual
packets which could travel an independent route to the destination where they would then be put back into one packet).
50
MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 107.
51
MITCHELL, supra note 34, at I50 (analogizing that the distributed design is unlike banana republics because it does
not have a clear center of authority, which makes it difficult to take over in a coup).
52
HANSON, supra note 38, at 59.
53
HANSON, supra note 38, at 59.
54
HANSON, supra note 38, at 59.
43
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an operational military network under tight security, and ARPANET, a network for connecting the
ARPA-funded researchers. 55 Through the 1980s, more networks (BITNET, CSNET, FIDONET,
USENET, etc.) came online and today, these linked networks are known as the Internet. 56
The Internet became more usable for the average person when in 1991, Tim Berners-Lee
and his group at the European Center for Nuclear Research in Switzerland unveiled the World Wide
Web, allowing an Internet user to click on a hyperlink and go directly to that information. 57 Soon
thereafter, web browsers made the web friendlier to the recreational user and the number of Internet
users has continued to grow. 58 "The development of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and
the World Wide Web gave rise to the e-commerce boom of the late 1990s." 59

B. The Backbone of the Internet
The Internet is a very large system of interconnected networks "with significant built-in
capacity to resist concentrations of power and authoritarian control." 60 It is a packet-switching network, which distributes messages by breaking them up into smaller addressed packets that follow
independent routes to their destination, where they are reassembled into the original message. 61 Instead of a central control, independent routers ensure "the addressed packets flow around saturated
channels." 62 Not only does this system provide improved efficiency, it provides a more secure system
of communication. 63 "If one node goes down, the network reroutes around it." 64 Depending on the
demand at any given time, packets travel on the most efficient path, causing there to be no predictable paths of travel. 65 There is also no way of prohibiting a packet from traveling on an open network
of a particular State. 66 One message, depending on size, can be divided up into multitude of packets,
which all theoretically can travel on a different path through the cyberspace of different sovereign

55

HANSON, supra note 38, at 59.
George K Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1094-95 (2000) (noting
ARPANET was renamed DARPANET, which ended in 1989).
57
HANSON, supra note 38, at 62.
58
HANSON, supra note 38, at 62 (explaining the browser program, Mosaic, helped launch the popularity of the Internet
when it began to circulate American universities in 1993).
59
Kyle Dobitz et al., The Characterization and Measurement of Cyber Warfare 3 (May 2008) (unpublished paper) (on
file with USSTRATCOM Global Innovation and Strategy Center), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadata
Prefix=html&identifier=ADA497907.
60
MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150 (emphasizing that although a decentralized model can be beneficial, it allows
subversives to lurk in the uncontrolled territory, which has led both governmental and commercial organizations to create
"firewalls" to secure computers).
61
WALKER, supra note 56, at 1096 (extrapolating that if messages are broken up into smaller packets and travel different
routes because of overloaded routes, it is possible that the smaller packets may travel through computers in multiple
countries and reassemble in another country).
62
HANSON, supra note 38, at 58.
63
HANSON, supra note 38, at 58.
64
HANSON, supra note 38, at 58.
65
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 63 (2006) (describing the difficulty the packet-switching design poses for law
enforcement in performing wiretaps because it is difficult to predict which path packets will take unlike in a circuitswitched network where there is only one route a message can travel).
66
See MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150-51.
56
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States to their final destination, where they will be reassembled into the original message. 67
Different computers and networks are able to communicate with each other because they
were all designed to use the same universal language, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). 68 ARPA required the use of this common language, which spread because of its open
design and its freely available software and documentation. 69
No single entity- academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit - administers the Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands
of separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to
use common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information
with other computers .... There is no centralized storage location, control point, or
communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for
a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet. 70
A great deal of the functionality of the Internet is attributed to the end-to-end principle,
which network architects, Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark, used as their guiding principle in designing the Internet. 71
Rather than build into this network a complex set of functionality thought to be
needed by every single application, this network philosophy pushes complexity to the
edge of the network - to the applications that run on the network, rather than the
network's core. The core is kept as simple as possible. 72
So any changes to the architecture of the Internet such as authentication or content filtering should not be done by changes to the network itself, but rather by applications attached to the
network. 73
The backbone of the Internet being the packet-switching network and the common language of TCP/IP is essential to maintain the current interoperable Internet. 74 In the interest of cyber
security, commercial and governmental organizations utilize firewalls to protect themselves from the
evils lurking on the Internet. 75 These firewalls are applications that keep computers safe from some
attacks and prevent some websites from being seen, but they do not stop the flow of electrons on the
network, which crosses all State boundaries.
67
68
69
70

See WALKER, supra note 56, at 1095.
See HANSON, supra note 38, at 6r.
See HANSON, supra note 38, at 61 ("The Internet became the network of networks using this protocol.") ..
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining the court's findings of fact regarding the creation

of the internet and the development of cyberspace).
71
LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44 (commending the end-to-end principle as being an important reason the Internet has
produced innovation and growth but attributing consequences to it such as making identification and authentication
extremely difficult).
72
LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44.
73
LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44.
74
HANSON, supra note 38, at 64.
75
MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150-51 (analogizing firewalls to ancient walled cities that only allowed traffic to pass
through narrow gates to be defended from unwarranted attacks).
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C World-wide Dependence on the Internet
Since its humble beginnings in a research lab in 1969, "cyberspace has grown and spread to
become a commons, a critical infrastructure that is pervasive and upon which societies worldwide
have become dependent for commerce, recreation, communication, delivery of government services,
research, education and a host of other activities." 76 A key qualification to being a major State power
today is Internet connectivity. 77 In order to survive as a State and remain economically competitive,
States have to embrace the Internet and continue to build the infrastructure that it requires. 78 The
global networking of high speed information processing systems are "made possible by the ground
based international telecommunications infrastructure and a growing constellation of satellites which
provide countries with a means to acquire and transmit information." 79
In 2010, global Internet usage was over 2 billion people. 80 Most States have public facilities, such as libraries and Internet cafes, where people can log onto the Internet for free. 81 "U.S. and
international businesses trade goods and services in cyberspace, moving assets across the globe in
seconds. In addition to facilitating trade in other sectors, cyberspace is itself a key sector of the global
economy." 82 Around the world, States' critical infrastructures such as power distribution, telecommunications, banking, emergency services, transportation, national defense, and more are becoming
ever dependent on the efficiencies offered by cyberspace. 83 Stock exchanges and Air Traffic Control
around the world are linked and dependent on the cyber infrastructure. 84 Cyberspace has become
the seas of commerce and the backbone of our global society, which demands a regime of sovereignty
that will ensure the free flow of electrons currently enjoyed on the Internet.

76

Julie ].C.H. Ryan et al., Cybersecurity Regulation: Using Analogies to Develop Frameworks for Regulation, INT'L CYBER
SEC. LEGAL & POLICY PROCEEDINGS 76, 78 (Eneken Tikk & Anna-Maria Taliharm eds., 2010), https://ccdcoe.org/
publications/legalproceedings/Ryan_Ryan_Tikk_Cybersecurity%20Regulation.pdf.
77
HANSON, supra note 38, at 184 (noting countries under authoritative regimes have approached the issue of controlling
the flow of information in different ways such as North Korea, which for the most part avoids Internet connectivity with
the rest of the world).
78
MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 168 (favoring the development of an open architecture system where anyone would be
allowed to set up a server and participate).
79
Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space, 9 U.S.A.F.]. OF LEG. STUD. 121, 123
(1999).
80
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25, at 1.
81
Dennis D. Strouble & Mary C. Carroll, Law and Cyber Wtir, SAIS 2008 PROCEEDINGS Paper 37, 1 (2008), http://
aisel.aisnet.org/sais2008/37 (indicating many aspects of global infrastructure such as, health care, telecommunications,
and energy are interconnected to the Internet while the law is the one discipline that is lacking).
82
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25, at 1 (noting the Internet has aided in the cultivation of new technologies and
entrepreneurship, the spread of free speech, and development of new social networks).
83
Wingfield, supra note 79, at 122-23.
84
Wingfield, supra note 79, at 123 (explaining that all services connected to the Internet are vulnerable to information
attack).
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ESTABLISHING SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEWEST FRONTIER

"To Aristotle the idea of a placeless, borderless community would have seemed very strange;
it appeared self-evident to him that a state - a self-governing political unit - had a definite,
bounded territory in which the citizens lived and over which they exerted control." 85 Defining what
constitutes sovereignty, however, is very difficult. 86 Sovereignty is defined as "1. Supreme dominion,
authority or rule. 2. The supreme political authority of an independent state. 3. The state itself." 87
The definition does not specify what sovereignty includes. In Article 2(4), the Charter of the United
Nations speaks of protecting territorial integrity, "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 88 "Preserving state sovereignty is a vital goal of both state-based international organizations and individual
countries." 89 Sovereignty, however, is treated differently in each physical domain, striking a balance
between States' interests and global needs.

A. The Essence ofSovereignty
"Just as nature gives each man an absolute power over all his own limbs, the social pact gives
the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, directed
by the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of sovereignty." 90 Philosophers have debated the
value of sovereignty for centuries. There is the pull of the natural state of being versus the need
for laws and regulations, which come with a society. Sovereignty is important for rule and order.
In order to have property rights, mankind must have sovereignty. In the 1600s, the philosopher,
Thomas Hobbes, discussed in his writings how society exists and why it is needed given the "state of
nature." 91 He concluded that society was necessary to put rules on man in order to control his unfettered desires. 92 Benedict De Spinoza, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau continued on his reasoning.93 In a Social Contract, Rousseau explains about different types of government and how they
derive their power to govern. 94 He acknowledges that man must give up his freedom to be governed,
but in turn, government protects him and his possessions. 95 "What man loses by the social contract is
85

MITCHELL, supra note 34, at r5r.
Patrick W Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can it Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REv. r, 8 (2009) (relying on Professor Stephen
Krasner's definition of sovereignty which conceptualizes sovereignty as being composed of domestic sovereignty,
interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty).
87
BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1524 (9th ed. 2009).
88
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
89
Franzese, supra note 86, at 7.
90
]EAN-]ACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 74 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
91
BERTRAND DE JouvENEL, SOVEREIGNTY; AN INQUIRY INTO THE PUBLIC GOOD. 231-32 (J.F. Huntington trans., Phoenix
Books 1963) (1957).

86

92
93

94

95

Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 23r.
See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90, at 74.
See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90 at 64-65.
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his natural liberty and absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains
by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses." 96
A domain is an area where control is exerted. 97 "Since classical times, two domains of operation dominated military and civilian operations: land and sea." 98 With the development of powered
flight in 1904, the domain of air became a new possibility. 99 Finally in 1955, the birth of the "space
age" opened the last physical domain, space, but it was not until the 1980s that "the US DoD acknowledged outer space as a fourth war fighting domain." 100 Even after the international community
recognized each of these domains, it took time for States to create specifically tailored treaties for
each domain to address sovereignty.
Now the world community needs to address the development of cyberspace and how sovereignty should relate to this new domain, which is like no other for it is man-made and does not
physically exist. Although once thought to be merely an enhancement to the other existing domains,
the concept of cyberspace as its own domain was recently accepted. 101 Even though cyberspace is very
different from the other naturally occurring domains, it does share some similarities.

B. Sovereignty in the Physical Domains
"The global reach of the Internet, a network of networks, leads some to assume it is ungovernable since it reaches beyond national borders." 102 Similar concerns existed when mankind entered the
domains of air and space. 10 3
When states and individuals started developing the technological capability to enter the domains of sea, air, and outer space, strong arguments existed for each of these
domains to remain free from sovereign control. However, state interests, such as trade
and national security, combined with a state's technological capabilities, ultimately
prevailed over these arguments and determined the current legal status of these domains.104
96
97

See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90 at 65.
Patrick D. Allen & Dennis P. Gilbert, Jr., The Information Sphere Domain Increasing Understanding and Cooperation,

THE VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE 132, 133 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., 2009),
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/ multimedia/pdf/09 _ GILBERT%201nfoSphere. pdf (adding that a domain is also a
sphere of activity, function, or activity).
98
Id. at 132.
99
100

Id.
Id. (examining the historical trends for recognizing new domains as following the sequences of acknowledging a

capability to operate in a domain is developed, which then becomes relatively commonplace, the capabilities in the
domain become recognized and exploited, the unique nature of the capabilities are further developed, and the domain is
continually developed through institutional and financial support).
101
Sorensen, supra note 8, at 92.
102
Frampton, supra note 4, at 11.
103
Frampton, supra note 4, at 11 (examining that because the systems that provide access to the Internet physically
reside within a country's jurisdiction as does the information therein, coupled with the fact that one may traverse
across the globally within milliseconds, States must consider how they can govern the Internet locally, nationally, and
internationally).
104
Franzese, supra note 86, at 29 (suggesting there are advocates who claim that because cyberspace as a domain is in its
infancy, government interference should be deterred in favor of sovereignty).
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Therefore, before looking at how to achieve sovereignty in cyberspace, one can gain insight
by looking at how States addressed sovereignty in the other domains of land, sea, air, and space.
Although ultimately codified in treatises, these international regimes resulted from State practices. 105
Since cyberspace will most likely follow the same trajectory, current State practices in cyberspace are
critical to its future.

i. Land
Originally, principles of sovereignty were about controlling territory and the people in it.
"During the 17'h century, the concept of sovereigns as individual monarchs gave way to the Westphalian state system of governments as sovereigns." 106 Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international system has been dominated by the State actor, which holds exclusive authority over the land
and people within its geographic boundary. 107 "Under [this] traditional understanding of sovereignty,
[States] occupy a territorially-defined physical locus, such that 'sovereignty' and 'country' are inextricably intertwined. [States] are defined by the territory they control, and [States] possess exclusive
authority over events within their borders." 108 Before long, States had to decide on a regime for the
seas.

ii. Sea
The seas, which cover "two-thirds of the world's surface,'' 109 originally were not controlled or
owned. 110 Over time, this led way to the high seas being open to all with sovereign States only exerting control over the territorial seas bordering its country. 111 "The evolution of the law can be seen as
a response to, and a reconciliation of, the conflicting interests of the Members of the international

105

Franzese, supra note 86, at 29 (noting that this reliance on state practices "means that a change in state interests or
technological capabilities might change the legal status of these domains").
106
]. CHRISTIAN KESSLER, VERIFYING NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES 3 (1995) (explaining that in a Westphalian system,
states act independently and answer to no higher authority. Prior to this system, even monarchs were beholden to God,
"and, prior to the reformation, the Pope.").
107
Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture The Demise ofthe Nation-State, the Dawn ofNew Paradigm
Warfare, and a Future for the Profession ofArms, 51 A.F. L. REv. 323, 324 (2001).
108
Kyle Dobitz et al., supra note 59, at 14 (citing Jeffrey K. Walker, The Demise ofthe Nation-State, the Dawn ofNew
Paradigm Warfare, and a Future for the Profession ofArms, 51 A.F. L. REv. 323 (2001)).
109
D. W BowETT, THE LAw OF THE SEA 1 (1967).
11
° Franzese, supra note 86, at 18-19 (quoting Roman Emperor Justinian I, who wrote the earliest recorded statement
on the law of the sea and "declared that the sea and its fish were available to all and no state could extend its jurisdiction
beyond the shore, which was defined as the high-water mark'').
111
Franzese, supra note 86, at 18-19 (noting that, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the debate over
who controlled the seas was divided between two camps: those who believed in mare liberum, or "open seas," and those
who believed in marre clausum, or "closed seas." Eventually, the prevailing legal theories acknowledged that states "enjoy
some rights to regulate in their own interests activities in the seas adjoining their coasts."); R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V
LowE, THE LAw OF THE SEA 59 (rev. ed., St. Martin's Press 1988) (1983).
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community." 112 Hugo Grotius, originally a proponent of freedom of the seas, eventually agreed with
other jurists that States have the right to regulate the seas along their coasts. 113 In 1625, Grotius
determined the territorial sea to be an area in which a state could exert control over those sailing on
it, as it could control someone on its land. 114 Cornelius van Bynkershoek adopted this principle in
1702. 115 "In those times, the coastal [S]tate was able to exercise control over the sea within the range
of a canon shot, namely, three miles. The three-mile limit has become thus the traditional breadth of
the territorial sea." 116 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a principle of international
law that the high seas were free and open while States could exert sovereignty in their territorial waters.117
Since early times, the law of the sea has had to balance conflicting economic, political, and
strategic interests among States. 118 "With the geometric expansion of international trade following
World War II ... and the increasing awareness of interdependence among the nations of the free
world, the importance of the freedom of the seas and navigation in their waters and airspace were
reemphasized." 119 This concept of sovereignty was first codified in the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, and culminated in 1982 with the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UN CLOS III), 120 which established national and international waters and airspace. 121 National waters include a State's internal waters and its territorial seas. 122 It set the territorial seas as twelve nautical miles from the States' shores. 123 The international waters include the contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones, and the high seas. 124 "Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms,'' which include
freedom of navigation and overflight of international waters. 125
Although sovereignty is recognized in the territorial waters of a State, UN CLOS III provides
for the "innocent" passage of ships, not aircraft, through these waters "for the purpose of continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea'' as long as "it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State." 126 The Convention prohibits the launch and recovery of
aircraft and any exercise with weapons while a ship is conducting innocent passage, considering these
112

BowETT, supra note 109, at 1.
Franzese, supra note 86, at 19; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V LowE, supra note 111.
114
]OHN KISH, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 6 (1973).
115
KISH, supra note 114, at 6.
116
KISH, supra note 114, at 6.
117
Franzese, supra note 86, at 19 (attributing this change in philosophy to the comparative peace of the nineteenth
century, during which the sea had come to signify a medium for trade).
118
BowETT, supra note 109, at 1.
119
]OHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 723 (1990) ("It is apparent ... that the legal regime of the
oceans can have a significant impact on national security.").
12
° Franzese, supra note 86, at 21 (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, pt. II, § 3,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
121
DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWP l-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1-2 (2007)
[hereinafter COMMANDERS HANDBOOK].
122
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2.
123
Franzese, supra note 86, at 20.
124
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2.
125
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2.
126
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3.
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acts to be prejudicial to the peace of the coastal State. 127 "In the territorial sea, submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." 128 The Convention permits coastal States to "suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent
passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security." 129
In straits used for international navigation, UN CLOS III provides for the right of "transit
passage,'' "freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious
transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." 130 During "transit passage,'' ships and submarines
can transit in their normal mode of operation. 131 Bordering States are not allowed to suspend transit
passage. 132 The Convention carefully balances a State's need for security with the world's needs for
the freedom of navigation of the seas for commerce and trade. It is a balance like this that the new
domain of cyberspace requires.

iii. Air
Like cyberspace, the air was initially thought to be common to all. 133 With the rise of property rights, the belief that the owner of the land also owned the air above it became the law. 134 The concept of air sovereignty came with the age of flight, 135 and international law regarding air sovereignty
started with state practice. 136 "The actions of various states throughout World War I, especially neutral countries' refusal to allow overflight, firmly established air sovereignty as customary international
law by the end of the war." 137 The first codification was in 1919 in the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation in France, commonly known as the Paris Convention. 138 It established
exclusive sovereignty in the air, but it made an exception for the right of innocent passage across the
airspace. 139 The final codification was in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly
referred to as the Chicago Convention, which states: "the contracting States recognize that every
127

UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3.
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3.
129
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3.
130
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2.
131
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2.
132
UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2.
133
Franzese, supra note 86, at 22 (citing Charles Anthony Roberts, Air Sovereignty and International Law 5-7 (1959)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, on file with Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center at Maxwell Air Force Base))
(explaining that, under Roman law, the air was considered omnium communes, or something that "was incapable of being
the object of a private right," and, subsequently, common to all).
134
Franzese, supra note 86, at 22; Roberts, supra note 133, at 5.
135
Franzese, supra note 86, at 22 (noting that, although the age of flight curtailed the idea of private ownership of
airspace, it brought about this "concept of air sovereignty).
136
Franzese, supra note 86, at 22.
137
Franzese, supra note 86, at 22; Roberts supra note 133, at 49-55; see also DAVID H. N. JOHNSON, RIGHTS IN Am
SPACE 32 (1965).
138
Franzese, supra note 86, at 23.
139
Franzese, supra note 86, at 23 (understanding that this "innocent passage" exception in air sovereignty echoes the
"innocent passage" exception in sea sovereignty).
128
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State has complete and exclusive sovereignty above its territory'' and does not recognize any right of
"innocent passage." 140 Therefore, planes cannot fly through national airspace without permission of
the sovereign, which can complicate air travel. "While [S]tates ultimately resolved the issue of [S]tate
sovereignty in air, they left unresolved the question of how high sovereignty extended." 141

iv. Outer Space
With the dawn of rockets and satellites, the world had to decide how high up a State's sovereignty goes. 142 Some argued that it extended indefinitely, but this was not practical given the laws
of planetary science and the lack of ability to exert control in space. 143 "Sovereignty can only truly
exist if states can exert control, or sovereignty over the areas they claim." 144 Prior to the launching
of satellites and the beginning of actual space research in 19 57, no sovereign conducted activity in
outer space, thus precluding any effective control over outer space and the celestial bodies. 145 The
United States and the Soviet Union were the first States to conduct actual research in outer space,
but neither State made any territorial claim. 146 In 1958, the two States came to an early agreement to
prohibit territorial sovereignty over outer space. 147 United States policy makers "faced the challenge
to develop policy that protected Space for peaceful purposes for the good of all mankind, while at the
same time that responded to the potential Armageddon-like conflict in the frigid, biting reality of the
Cold War arms race." 148
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 codifies the legal status of outer space as free from sovereignty.149 China, however, is challenging this principle and arguing that their sovereignty extends
into outer space, because there is no definition of where territorial air space ends and outer space
begins. 150 Even though the Treaty provides that exploration in space is supposed to be for peace-

140

The Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, pt. I, ch. I, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295;

see also Franzese, supra note 86, at 23-24.
141
Franzese, supra note 86, at 24.
142
Franzese, supra note 86, at 24 (suggesting that the implicit solution was "to simply apply the Roman maxim ... 'he
who owns the soil owns it up to the sky'").
143
Franzese, supra note 86, at 24; see also GYULA GAL, SPACE LAw 61-70 (1969).
144
Franzese, supra note 86, at 24 (noting that despite these problems, the United States and Soviet Union, leaders in the
space race in the late 1950s and early 19602, continued to support the notion that state sovereignty extended into outer
space).
145
KISH, supra note 114, at 82.
146
KISH, supra note 114, at 82.
147
KISH, supra note 114, at 82.
148
Tom James, Military Activities in Space: Law, Policy and the Expected Maturation of Tactically Relevant Space Control, 4
ARMY SPACE]. 24, 25 (2005), http://www.smdcarmyforces.army.mil/Pic_Archive/
ASJ_PDFs/ASJ_VOL_4_N0_2_Article_5.pdf.
149
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410.
15
° Franzese, supra note 86, at 26-27; see also Peter A. Dutton, China's Views ofSovereignty and Methods ofAccess Control
(Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_ testimonies/08_02_27_ wrts/08_02_27_dutton_
statement. php.
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ful purposes, it is used for military purposes such as intelligence collection and communications. 151
"There is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in Space, applying
force from Space to Earth or conducting military operations in and through Space." 152 State practice
has made it clear that peaceful purposes can-and do-include some military operations. 153
Cyberspace has been likened to the domain of space: 154
"Space and cyber are cross-cutting domains, enabling the three other finite spatial domains through faster decision making. The domains are global in scope and indifferent to physical terrain or lines drawn on a map with near instantaneous effects transmitted through their domains. Both cyber and space are global commons vital to civil
and commercial activities and essential to the economy and military operations." 155
One major difference, however, is the ease of accessibility of cyberspace versus space. A Master's thesis from 1965 once asked: "where is space? [W]ho controls it?" 156 These are the same questions that we ask today about cyberspace.

C Sovereignty in Cyberspace
Cyberspace needs the rule of law inherent in sovereignty, but it needs to be open for international transit. ''As with maritime trade, the path to future prosperity relies on open access, engagement and cooperation among friends and allies in the global cyberspace commons." 157 Although
similar to space, cyberspace cannot be a true global commons "governed collectively for the common
benefit of all mankind,'' 158 effectively prohibiting State sovereignty. The great number of people
and companies in cyberspace need rules and regulations that only a sovereign can provide. This
new domain needs a navigational regime like the Law of the Sea that carefully balances the needs of
national security but ensures international freedoms. 159 "It must recognize that the Internet is part of
an international telecommunications system where freedom of access benefits all States, and to which
any artificially drawn boundaries would have to be consistent with legitimate issues of national sovereignty and customary international law." 160 A regime of "transit passage" can strike this balance.
151
Robert W Jarman, The Law ofNeutrality in Outer Space (Sep. 8, 2008) (unpublished LL. M. Thesis, McGill
University) (on file with author), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485937.pd£
152
James, supra note 148, at 55.
153
Schaap, supra note 17, at 162.
154
David M. Franklin, U.S. Command Relationships in the Conduct ofCyber Warfare: Establishment, Exercise, and
Institutionalization of Cyber Coordinating Authority 10 (May 3, 2010) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Naval War
College), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525274.pd£
155
Franklin, supra note 154 at 10.
156
Carl E. Buchmann, Space Law: State Responsibility for Spacecraft Damages and for the Return ofPersonnel and
Equipment 1 (1965) (unpublished thesis, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army) (on file with The
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School Library).
157
Frampton, supra note 4, at 20.
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Kanuck, supra note 20, at 1575.
159
Steven M. Barney, Innocent Packets? Applying Navigational Regimes ftom the Law ofthe Sea Convention by Analogy to
the Realm of Cyberspace, 48 NAVAL L. REv. 58, 63 (2001).
160
Barney, supra note 159, at 64.
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i. Utopian Beginnings
In the 1990s, John Perry Barlow, lyrics writer for the Grateful Dead, advocated for a separate
legal regime for cyberspace, totally outside of state control. 161 Barlow and others believed that cyberspace was "a new frontier, where people lived in peace, under their own rules, liberated from the
constraints of an oppressive society and free from government meddling." 162 After President Clinton
signed the Communications Decency Act into law, Barlow wrote his famous Declaration of Cyberspace Independence, based on the Declaration of Independence, and distributed it widely. 163
"Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to
leave us alone ... You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one ... Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you,
we cannot obtain order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened
self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may
be distributed across many of your jurisdictions ... We will create a civilization of the
Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before." 164
"The belief that cyberspace should be free from government interference, or sovereignty, led
to the idea that cyberspace is, in fact, immune from state sovereignty." 165 However, this ideal has
become very unrealistic. Although cyberspace was once believed to be free from government control
and regulation, States are being to exert their control over cyberspace in order to ensure liberty. 166 As
a result, sovereignty needs to apply in cyberspace. "We build a world where freedom can flourish not
by removing from society any self-conscious control, but by setting it in a place where a particular
kind of self-conscious control survives." 167 States will have to want to exert sovereignty in cyberspace
and in order to do this there will have to be borders in cyberspace. How States construct these
borders is another matter. 168
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ii. The Taming of Cyberspace
Over the last decade, States have begun exerting their sovereignty in cyberspace in response
to complaints from its citizens and a need to control the information seen by those citizens. Western
States have exerted control on content or access to content in order to protect their citizens from
child pornography, sale of Nazi paraphernalia, and other ills. 169 States have also had to regulate content on the Internet in order to safeguard intellectual property. Repressive states such as China and
Belarus have constructed barriers to access in an effort to keep western ideals of democracy from its
citizens' purview on the Internet. 170
As far back as 1995, the Germans prosecuted the German manager of CompuServe
Deutschland for "failing to prevent child pornography, much of which came from outside Germany,
from reaching German citizens." 171 Regulating local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is a key to
States controlling what content its citizens can view on the Internet. Once notified of the existence of
illegal content, German, British, and French laws require their local ISPs to screen out the offending
content. 172 This protects the citizens of those States, but it does not stop the offending content from
transiting the States' cyberspace.
Prior to 2000, it was believed that a State could not control an Internet provider in another
State. 173 In a landmark decision, the French courts held that Yahoo, a United States corporation,
violated French law by allowing Nazi paraphernalia to appear for sale on web pages accessible in
France. 174 Acknowledging that a one hundred percent blockage was impossible, the court "ordered
Yahoo to make a 'reasonable effort' to block French users." 175 France was not blocking the websites
from its cyberspace, but it was erecting a border around its citizens whom it wanted to protect from
the Nazi goods being sold.
Although China allows access to the Internet, it has carefully engineered accessible content. China "is trying to create an Internet that is free enough to support and maintain the world's
fastest growing economy, and yet closed enough to tamp down political threats to its monopoly on
power." 176 In order to accomplish this goal, China has created a "firewall" popularly known as the
"Great Firewall of China'' around its people that filters and removes any unapproved information
headed to a Chinese national. 177 In 2002, Yahoo signed the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline far the
Chinese Internet Industry, which requires that "Yahoo filter materials that might be harmful or threat-
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ening to Party rule." 178 These processes, however, do not prevent the data from actually entering
China. Thus, determined savvy Internet users are able to circumvent most, if not all, of these barriers
with relative ease. 179
E-commerce requires a stable environment controlled by a sovereign who can protect
companies and consumers from fraud. Pierre Omidyar, founder of eBay, desired to make a company
self-regulated by its users, but "quickly learned that to prevent fraud, enforce its contracts, and ensure
stability in its auction services, it would depend critically on government coercion and the rule of law
provided by a stable country like the United States." 180 Originally run by community enforcement,
eBay now has a full-time security staff of over eight hundred people. 181
States are creating boundaries in cyberspace to protect its citizens, rather than its
territory. Cyber crimes are being prosecuted by States regardless of the fact that the person was not
physically within the State's territory when accessing the Internet. The United States prosecutes a
man who views child pornography on the Internet while physically being in another country by using extra-territorial jurisdiction. 182 "Developing sovereignty, [however,] ultimately requires an international regime with specific rules and procedures regulating state activity in that domain, including
a requirement to identify and track transnational actors." 183

iii. A Navigational Regime for Cyberspace - Transit Passage
As with the domains of sea, air, and space, there is a need for international space in cyberspace. ''And like the seas, the U.S. will feel the need to maintain 'freedom of navigation' in cyberspace as a primary beneficiary of its existence." 184 The networks of cyberspace need to be kept "open
for the economic, social, and security interests of this country and its citizens." 185 Cyberspace has
provided an information-based revolution in the public, private, and military sectors. 186
This domain, however, is very different from the other physical domains. A State may not
even be aware of someone in their cyberspace. Cyber operations occur "at computing speeds delivered at the speed oflight." 187 In order to physically enter a State, a traveler must present a passport;
yet a cyber traveler can enter any State in cyberspace without any documents. This freedom is not
something that we want to stop with the recognition of sovereignty in cyberspace. Therefore, international law needs to adopt a regime for cyberspace that allows for the free flow of electrons through
all of cyberspace.
178
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An international strait is a fitting analogy for Cyberspace, which has an extremely high
volume of traffic that is exponentially growing. 188 "For cyberspace capabilities, like e-mail, the utility
of the tool to each user increases exponentially as the number of people using the tool increases." 189
Therefore, it is in society's interest to keep this traffic in cyberspace free flowing, like the desire to
keep the high volume of traffic transiting an international strait. There are no clear borders in cyberspace. Once a packet of information is launched into cyberspace, it is nearly impossible to tell when
it passes from one sovereign to another until it finally arrives. ''Although every computer, server,
and wire is located in some place subject to other regulatory frameworks, the paths by which packets travel across the Internet are largely beyond the control of the user and may pass through many
different sovereign jurisdictions in route from senders to recipient." 190 In an international strait, the
territorial seas of more than one State overlap. The public and freely accessible parts of cyberspace are
like international straits connecting the sovereign territories where the hardware is located.
"[T] ransit passage allows all ships and aircraft freedom of navigation and overflight solely for
the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the international strait between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone." 191 Cyberspace absolutely requires this type of framework in order not to disrupt the flow of
ideas and commerce in cyberspace. "Transit passage" would allow the electrons to transit cyberspace
in their normal mode of operation. No State could suspend transit passage of its cyberspace; but if it
so chose, it could disconnect from the network. In addition, transit passage would apply to military
operations and would allow for the transit passage through a neutral territory. The hardware, however, is actually in sovereign territory. The relationship between the physical hardware and cyberspace
is similar to that of territorial waters and the high seas.
"Every component of every information and telecommunications network around the
world, under the sea, and in the air is subject to proprietary interests - whether that
of a private company, a sovereign government, or possibly both. Each copper wire,
fiber-optic cable, microwave relay tower, satellite transponder, or Internet router has
been produced or installed by some entity whose legal successors not only maintain
ownership of that physical asset but also expect protection of the same by sovereign
authorities." 192
Recognizing a right of "transit passage" in cyberspace would merely make current State practice customary international law. Every day, States violate the sovereignty of other States as emails
from one office transit across national boundaries in route to the office next door. Because of the way
the Internet operates, one message can be broken up into multiple packets that travel the public Internet in the most expeditious manner regardless of path. Cyberspace knows no boundaries; packets
do not request permission when transiting from one State to another.
188
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Private password protected networks in cyberspace should be treated as internal waters, where
complete territorial sovereignty is imposed. Information from unauthorized users on these networks
would violate territorial sovereignty. The Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) would be one example of such network. This type of regime would balance
society's need for freedom of navigation of cyberspace while protecting national security.
Sovereignty in cyberspace is required and States will need to exert this sovereignty. It is
imperative that States police crime, protect property interest, and take action against known attacks
originating within its cyberspace. 193 Global society is heavily reliant on the Internet's continuing
functionality, which requires packets to continue surfing freely through cyberspace. In addition,
States cannot currently exert territorial control over the electrons passing through its cyberspace;
therefore, there is no way to enforce exclusive sovereignty in cyberspace. Consequently, States should
operate in cyberspace, assuming a right of "transit passage,'' and, with time, the practice will become
a part of customary international law.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TO CYBERSPACE

The governance of cyberspace will require the utilization of all types of law, such as criminal
law, tort law, and property law. Since cyberspace interconnects global society, it most assuredly will
require international law. As long as cyberwar is possible, the international body of law known as the
law of armed conflict 194 will apply to cyberspace.

A. Applying the Law ofArmed Conflict to Cyberspace
Over the last decade, great scholars have debated whether the law of armed conflict (LOAC)
should apply to cyberspace, and the majority consensus agrees that it should. 195 The pivotal question,
193
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then, is whether a cyberattack is an act of war. 196 "The presence-or absence-of a state of armed
conflict carries significance, because during armed conflict the actions of belligerents are usually governed by the law of war, not the more - restrictive rules applicable to law enforcement situations." 197
The discomfort in applying LOAC to cyberspace stems from the fact that this body of lawobviously-did not contemplate cyberspace. 198 Therefore, law of armed conflict does not directly
apply to cyberspace and does not take into account all of the differences between cyberwarfare and
traditional kinetic warfare; instead, it must be applied through analogy. 199 In addition, Additional
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention extends the law of armed conflict to any new method of warfare. Additional Protocol I requires a State to review any "new weapon, means or method of warfare
to ensure its employment would not violate international law. 200
What activities in cyberspace constitute a threat or use of force is the subject of much debate.
''At a point along the spectrum of interstate activities called the line of belligerency, a use of force by
a state establishes an international armed conflict as a matter of law and the law of armed conflict
applies." 201 ]us ad bellum is this body of international law, found in both customary and treaty law,
governing a State's resort to force against another state. 202 The UN Charter is the primary modern
source of jus ad bellum. 203 In accordance with the UN Charter, "all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." 204 In order to know what activities between states are forbidden in cyberspace, we must know what activities constitute the threat or use of force in cyberspace. In Article 51,
the UN Charter offers that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 205
Humanity must determine what an armed attack is in cyberspace in order to know when a state has a
right to protect itself. ''Although a state never loses its right to use force in self-defense [under Article
51] in response to a use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4), the right of self-defense under
customary international law may not always justify an armed response." 206
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B. Defining the Use ofForce/Armed Attack in Cyberspace
Without defining any of the terms individually, the UN Charter uses the terms "use of
force,'' "armed attack,'' and "aggression" in its various provisions, spurring over fifty years of debate
about the terms' meanings. 207 Although economic and political coercion can threaten international
stability, generally the use of force is understood to mean armed force. 208 "Until the advent of information operations, most coercion could be handily categorized into one of several boxes, for few
options existed that could not be typed as political, economic, or armed in nature." 209 Cyber attacks,
however, do not fit neatly into any of these categories. Cyber attacks are launched for a multitude of
reasons with a wide spectrum of effects. Therefore, it had to be determined "whether a cyber attack,
because it does not involve the use of kinetic force, is a prohibited use of force under the Charter and
customary international law." 210 Michael N. Schmitt analyzed this and answered it in the affirmative,
stating "the key is to move from an instrument-based paradigm (economics, politics, kinetic military
force) to one based on the consequences caused by the action." 211 To help analyze the consequences
of an operation, Schmitt developed seven criteria to determine whether the effects are "more like
those caused by economic and political coercion or by physical coercion." 212
In defining the use of force in cyberspace, most scholars look to the seven-factor analysis
proposed by Michael N. Schmitt to determine a use of force. 213 These factors include: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and State responsibility214
and give a qualitative analysis of how military operations differ from nonmilitary operations, such
as diplomatic and economic coercion. 215 The use of force does not include non-physical means of
psychological, political or economic warfare." 216
The next major law of armed conflict issue is evaluating when a cyber attack amounts to an
"armed attack'' under Article 51, allowing a State to respond with force in self-defense. 217 The previous analysis is not applicable in this determination, because "use of force" and "armed attack'' is not
the same. 218 Typically, cyber attacks with violent effects are the legally equivalent to armed attacks. 219
Therefore, cyber attacks utilizing cyber weapons (e.g., viruses, worms, logic bombs) and resulting
in human suffering or property damage (beyond the computer program or data attacked) can be
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considered "armed attacks." 220 Although some cyber events, such as spamming a state or modifying a state's website, may be damaging and seem to equate to an "armed attack,'' they may not be
sufficiently egregious or may lack the required violence to authorize the use of force in response. 221
The law of armed conflict will also generally not apply if there is no state attribution of the cyber attack. 222 States will ordinarily utilize criminal law to respond to these attacks. 223 Most cyber operations
will not rise to the level of an "armed attack'' and will only be interventions into the internal affairs
of another state. 224 If the law of armed conflict will rarely apply in cyberspace, then the same is true
for the law of neutrality. In those instances, however, where there is an international armed conflict
and the law of armed conflict does apply, States need to know their obligations under the law of
neutrality.

V.

NEUTRALITY

The designers created the Internet, as implied by its name, to be a single network to link
data across States and oceans. 225 In reality, the Internet is a multitude of different linked networks. 226
Therefore, there is no way to predict the State or States through which a packet will travel during
transmission. 227 A belligerent cannot know which route its cyber attack will take on its way to its
target, which makes it impossible to ensure that it does not cross a neutral's cyberspace territory. 228
In a cyberwar, how a State remains neutral has been the subject of much discourse. The
primary question is whether an electron from a belligerent State crossing through a neutral State's cyberspace territory is a violation of the law of neutrality. 229 Another question is whether a neutral State
is required to take action against a belligerent electron transiting its cyberspace. "More than a century
after the Hague Conventions' enactment, their general conception of neutrality remains controlling
law, but international law does not explicitly address cyberattacks and cyber neutrality." 230 This paper
argues that an electron passing through a neutral's State's cyberspace does not violate the neutral's
sovereignty and should not require action by the neutral State. 231 Since it appears that there is not go220
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ing to be any new international agreements written for cyberspace in the near future, it is imperative
to interpret the existing rules in the most appropriate fashion. "Because international law imposes a
dramatically different legal status on states that enter conflicts between other states as a belligerent,
compared with states electing to remain neutral, the choice between belligerency and neutrality represents one of the most significant responsibilities for a sovereign's national security decision-making

b0 dy. "232
A. The Law ofNeutrality
The law of neutrality embodied in the Hague Conventions is basically as old as time, in
the sense it is based on basic economic principles. Neutrals want to stay out of war and yet want to
protect their commerce and trade routes. Belligerents need resources, which neutrals have. Since the
law of neutrality has endured with little change through all of the technological revolutions of the
last several centuries, there is no reason to believe the same law will not apply in cyberspace, where
commerce along with communication is paramount.

i. History of Neutrality
As early as the fourteenth century and possibly even earlier, "neutrality'' was applied in its
modern sense. 233 Since at least the fifteenth century, a prime objective of belligerents was the destruction of the enemy's trade, which appears to have led to the law of neutral rights at sea. 234
The problem has always been the reconciliation of the incompatible interests of neutrals and belligerents, or, rather, a compromise between these irreconcilable interests.
The neutral has sought to maintain his freedom of trade; the belligerent has sought
to cut off all supplies from his enemy. The desire to seize goods of the enemy may be
HUMANITARIAN LAw RESEARCH INITIATIVE, COMPUTERS AND WAR: THE LEGAL BATTLESPACE I5 (2004), (unpublished
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ascribed to either or both of two purposes: (I) weakening the enemy by striking at both
his import and export trade and thus contributing to his defeat; (2) obtaining supplies
of which the capturing state is in need. 235
According to writings from the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, it is believed that this
is how the law of neutrality developed, rather than from a principle that neutrals do not render aid
to belligerents. 236 Resources required by belligerents have served neutral states well through time. 237
Although neutrals have long complained about breaches of the law of neutrality, it appears through
history that these neutral States have netted far more gains than losses. 238

ii. 1907 Hague Convention V
The Hague Convention V Respecting The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land and in the Hague Convention XII Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War embody the international law on neutrality. 239 Per the tides of these
conventions, they apply in the case of war. Therefore, there must be an international armed conflict in order for the law of neutrality to apply. 240 Hague Convention III Relative To the Opening of
Hostilities governs the beginning of hostilities. With regards to neutral states, Hague Convention III
states:
The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay,
and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which
may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the
absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the
existence of a state of war. 241
These provisions will limit the application of neutrality law to cyberwarfare. Thus far, no
States have taken responsibility for any cyber attacks.
In circumstances where a cyber attack rises to the level of a cyberwar, 242 the States involved
in the conflict would need to be identified. In accordance with Hague Convention III, the parties to
conflict would need to notify neutral States. Until that time, a neutral State would not be bound by
the obligations of Hague Convention V, unless they should have known about the conflict. Even if a
cyber attack is deemed an "armed attack,'' generally the identity of the attacker is unknown. In such
235
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237
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a situation, the law of neutrality would not apply because the neutral State would not be on notice of
an armed conflict.
When there is an actual international armed conflict in cyberspace, Hague Convention V
governs the rights and duties of neutral States. The movement of troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies by belligerents across the territory of a neutral state is forbidden. 243 Belligerents are forbidden from erecting wireless telegraphy stations or other apparatus for the purpose of
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea on the territory of a neutral state. 244 They are
further prohibited from using any of such stations erected prior to the war on the territory of a neutral state for purely military purposes, unless it has been opened for the service of public messages. 245
These prohibitions apply only to direct communications by belligerents to their forces. 246 A neutral
State has a responsibility to prohibit such activity from being conducted on its territory. 247 Certainly,
belligerents may not launch an attack from within the telecommunication infrastructure of a neutral
State. 248 There is an exception, however, to this principle of information warfare.

a. Telegraph Exception
A neutral State is allowed to let belligerents use telegraph or telephone cables or wireless
telegraphy apparatus belonging to the neutral State or its nationals. 249 The neutral State does, however, have to ensure any restrictions or prohibitions are applied impartially to both belligerents. 250
The same applies for private infrastructure systems. 251 If this is the case, a belligerent may utilize the
State's telecommunications infrastructure and equipment. 252 The level of State activism by the neutral, though, may range; the greater the degree of activism, the more likely it is a neutral State will violate its duties under the law of neutrality. 253 It is one thing for private companies of a neutral State
to conduct commerce with a belligerent State, and another for the State itself to assist a belligerent. 254
As long as a neutral State impartially makes its networks available to both sides, there is no reason
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why the mere passage of electrons through a neutral state would violate neutrality. 255 "The smaller
the degree of state activism, the less there is reason to speak of the state violating neutrality." 256

b. Law of the Seas "Peaceful Passage"
Hague Convention XIII governs the rights and duties of neutral States in naval war. 257 The
provisions are similar to those on land, but "the neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere
passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents." 258 Belligerent
war-ships can remain in a port or territorial water of a neutral state for up to twenty-four hours. 259
In addition to Hague XIII, the Law of the Sea Convention provides more guidance to
neutrals and belligerents in regards to the different navigational regimes. 260 In international straits,
it protects the right of transit passage, even through neutral straits. 261 Belligerent forces transiting a
neutral international strait must refrain from hostile activities not incident to their transit, but they
may "take defensive measures consistent with their security, including the launching and recovery
of military devices, screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance, and may
respond in self-defense to a hostile act or hostile intent." 262 Once again, analogizing cyberspace to an
international strait results in a potentially practical rule for international law.
Due to the way the Internet is structured, it is foolhardy to prohibit a cyber weapon to peacefully pass through a neutral State's cyberspace. In most situations, the neutral State will not even
know that the electrons passed through its sovereignty. 263 Nor is there much the State can do, short
of severing all computer connections with other States.

B. Responsibility ofa Neutral
Some scholars argue that a neutral must keep electrons from a belligerent from transiting its
cyberspace. 264 These same scholars suggest that a neutral will lose its protected status if it fails to meet
this impossible burden.
Under this rule, if a neutral state cannot or does not take action to halt a cyber attack,
a belligerent may choose to counter by physically attacking the neutral state's commu255

SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 231, at 15 (adding that if a neutral state does not act impartially, the "victim'' belligerent
may take necessary and proportionate steps to end the violation).
256
T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83.
257
Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War of 18 October 1907.
258
Hague Convention, supra note 257, art. 10.
259
Hague Convention, supra note 257, art. 12.
26
° COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4.
261
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4 (caveating the idea that a neutral nation may suspend passage of
belligerent warships through its territorial seas).
262
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4.
263
See Kelsey, supra note 28, at 1444-45 (considering the scope of the duty of neutrality; specifically, whether neutral
states hold the practical methods of detecting a cyber attack),.
264
Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 56 ("A surrender of neutrality or acquiescence to belligerent activity may draw a neutral
state into the conflict.").

30

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 6, No. 2

nications infrastructure. Thus, even without the physical violation of a neutral state's
territory, a cyber attack may force a neutral state to become unwillingly involved. 265
Why should we espouse such an impossible burden on neutrals? Nothing in the Hague
Conventions suggests that a State must defend against anything less than a physical invasion of its
territory. The Hague Conventions allow for warships to pass through territorial waters of a neutral
and for the usage of telecommunication infrastructure. Jeffrey Kelsey in Hacking into International
Humanitarian Law: The Principle ofDistinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare argues that
the meaning of neutrality should evolve to an "intent-based view of neutrality'' so that neutrals are
able to escape an impossible burden. 266 "This view would not require the neutral state to take action
to prevent the unintentional passage of the cyber weapons through its borders .... " 267 This is the
right answer, but international law already allows for this.
It is an entirely different situation where a neutral State allows a belligerent to conduct attacks from its cyberspace. 268 In these cases, the neutral needs to aggressively pursue those committing
these attacks or face attack upon its own network. A neutral must also ensure that its servers are not
being used for command and control of belligerent fighters. In such a case, "the server might be a
valid military target because it's being used for the communications or command and control of the
enemy fighters in the areas of hostilities." 269 ''Although every server has a physical location, the Internet is not segmented along national borders, and the enemy may gain greater tactical advantage from
a server hosted half way around the world than from one located right in the middle of hostilities. 270
Neutrals will have to remain vigilant that belligerents do not use the servers located in their
sovereign territory for command and control, or face being subject to attack. International law, however, must acknowledge that cyberspace falls under the telegraph exception to the law of neutrality,
allowing electrons to freely transit cyberspace. One must remember that the law of neutrality only
applies in an actual international armed conflict in cyberspace. Just because there is an international
armed conflict on the ground does not necessarily mean there is a conflict in cyberspace, triggering the law of neutrality. The next section applies these concepts to the cyber attacks on Georgia in
2008.

VI.

CASE STUDY- CYBER ATTACKS ON GEORGIA (JULY/AUGUST 2008)

In the summer of 2008, attacks on Georgian government websites coincided with an actual
military ground conflict. 271 From July 18 to 20, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks hit the
265
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website for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. 272 Distributed denial-of-service attacks seek to
prevent individual users from using a computer resource, such as a website, by flooding the network
with bogus requests. 273 After years of tension in the South Ossetia region of Georgia between the
Georgian military and the Russian backed separatist forces, the Georgian government made a surprise attack on the separatists. 274 In retaliation on August 8, 2008, 275 Russian tanks entered Georgian
territory and a large-scale kinetic war began. 276 Substantial DDoS attacks against a large number
of Georgian websites, including government, education, news and media, banking and financial2 77
began almost immediately. 278 The Internet slowed to a crawl and websites were forced off-line. 279 In
addition, websites were hijacked and governmental websites were defaced. 28° Cyber attacks continued to the end of August despite a cease-fire agreement on August 12, 2008 ending military operations.281
Georgia, which depends on Russian and Turkish infrastructure for its Internet connectivity, 282
quickly moved critical websites to servers in the United States, Poland, and Estonia. 283 These countries have better cyber security and were able to prevent an information blockade of Georgia. 284 Private U.S technology companies, unbeknownst to the United States government, 285 allowed Georgia
to use their servers for news and governmental services, not military operations. 286 The Estonian government allowed the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hang on a server in their country
and the President of Poland hosted official press releases from the Georgian government on a section
of their website. 287 Contrary to Stephen Korns' and Joshua Kasten berg's assertions in Georgia's Cyber
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Left Hook, 288 the United States did not jeopardize the country's ability to remain neutral and immune
from attack in the Russo-Georgian conflict when a private enterprise allowed Georgia to relocate the
content of their websites onto United States servers; 289 neither did Estonia or Poland, who actually
offered state assistance, in contrast with the private assistance offered by the United States companies.290

A. Issues ofSovereignty
Before considering whether the law of neutrality was violated or whether it even applied, one
must look at issues of sovereignty. Since both Tulip and Google hosted Georgian websites on their
servers, one can assume that Georgian citizens at least accessed these websites, if not interacted with
them. These sites were on servers located in the United States without the consent of the United
States government. Therefore, Georgian citizens violated the sovereignty of the United States every
time they accessed these websites. 291 Unless of course, there is a right of "transit passage,'' which
would allow nationals of one State to freely transit the cyberspace of other States without the express
permission of the sovereign.

B. Why the Law ofArmed Conflict Did Not Apply to These Cyber Attacks
Assuming a right of "transit passage" exists, this analysis turns to the issue of neutrality. First,
law of armed conflict did not apply to the cyber attacks and therefore neither did the law of neutrality292 because the cyber attacks were not sufficiently linked to the international armed conflict
between Russia and Georgia. Although law of armed conflict clearly applied to the physical crossborder conflict involving armed forces, this does not necessarily mean that law of armed conflict
would apply to the cyber attacks. 293 The application oflaw of armed conflict to the Georgian cyber
attacks is highly problematic. 294 "The objective evidence of the case is too vague to meet the necessary criteria of both state involvement and gravity of effect." 295 Although the media targeted Russia as
being behind the DDoS or defacement attacks, there is no conclusive proof as to who was behind the
attacks; some experts are even skeptical that the Russian government played any role. 296
288
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There is no doubt regarding the involvement of the Russian hacker community in the
cyber attacks: the coordination of and support to the attacks took place mainly in the
Russian language and was conducted on Russian or Russia-friendly forums. However,
there is no evident link to the Russian administration, and the Russian government has
denied any involvement in the cyber assaults. The Project Grey Goose team was unable
to find, in their research into the Russian hacker sites, any references to state organizations guiding or directing attacks." 297
In fact, a self-appointed representatives of the Russian hacker underground claimed responsibility for a "Stop Georgia'' website, which was set up to coordinate some of the cyber attacks on
Georgian websites. 298 When cyber attacks cannot be sufficiently linked to ongoing hostilities, the
cyber attacks cannot take on the legal classification of the physical conflict. At this point, the cyber
attacks must go through their own analysis.
In the end, the damage was minimal - email disruptions and website unavailability. 299 The
damages were further limited by the low interconnectivity of the country. 300 "The main damage was
in limiting the nation's possibilities to distribute information about the ongoing military conflict,
in 'making its voice heard' to the world and in communicating with the Georgian people." 301 The
effects of the cyber attacks alone were not severe enough to amount to a "use of force" under Article
2(4) and certainly not enough to justify self-defense in response to an "armed attack'' under Article
51 302 therefore, neither the law of armed conflict nor the law of neutrality applied.

C. Regardless, the Law ofNeutrality Would Not Have Been Violated
Even if LOAC did apply to the situation, the telegraph exception to Hague V would permit a
neutral State to allow the use of its telecommunications infrastructure and equipment. 303
Of course, the level of state activism in permitting the use of telecommunications
may range, from simply accepting data flow through private infrastructure to lending server space as was the case with Poland and Estonia, to actively supporting the
functioning of telecommunications. Not all activities on this scale need necessarily be
interpreted in a similar measure in the light of Article 8 of the Hague Convention cited
above, but the smaller the degree of state activism, the less there is reason to speak of
the state violating neutrality. 304
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In addition, the cyber attacks were not military operations since Russia denied all involvement and there was no actual evidence to the contrary. 305 Therefore, the actions of the neutral States
could not have interfered with military operations. 306 Georgia also treated the cyber attacks as a computer security issue, rather than as cyberwarfare. 307 The website that the neutral States assisted with
were communication outlets and not military in nature. 308
Finally, Hague V requires that if a neutral State allows the use of its telecommunications
infrastructure by belligerents, it must do so impartially. 309 Russia never requested any similar assistance; therefore, there is no evidence of impartiality. 31 ° Consequently, even if the law of armed
conflict applied to the cyber attack in Georgia, the assisting States did nothing in violation of the law
of neutrality. 311

D. Cyber Cooperation
The assistance by Poland, Estonia, and the United States companies has been described as a
"cyber alliance." 312 This alliance limited the damages that the cyber attacks caused on Georgia. 313 The
governments of Poland and Estonia supported Georgia with technical assistance and server space. 314
In addition, two private companies in the United States gave Georgia server space. 315 Since the cyber
attacks were considered the work of hackers, it was a criminal problem. 316 As such, these attacks were
separate from the international armed conflict, which was conducted on the ground in Georgia. It
is in the interest of all States to have a global response to such criminal attacks. States should not be
afraid to assist in such non-state sponsored cyber attacks, because they fear violating the law of neutrality. Cyber security is going to take a global effort to be effective.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The designers of the Internet were utopians, who created a decentralized network to withstand nuclear attack, intending it to be a domain free of government control. They believed that this
new parallel world could escape the evils of government. The designers envisioned new communities
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in cyberspace would develop better ways of regulating conduct than traditional government. In the
beginning, it appeared that this new domain was borderless and beyond the control of States.
With time, however, cyberspace succumbed to human nature and its malfeasance. Citizens
are now looking to their sovereigns to police the bad acts occurring in cyberspace. As e-commerce
has exploded in cyberspace, companies also want the protections offered by a sovereign such as stability and preservation of property rights. The free flow of information has threatened the existence of
other sovereigns, who control their people through restricting and molding the information available
to their citizenry.
As States exert control in cyberspace, borders are forming in cyberspace. These borders,
however, are much different than the boundaries of a State's territory. They are jurisdictional boundaries affixed around each individual citizen of a state. China controls, through various measures,
what its citizens can access on the Internet, but it does not stop electrons from crossing through
its cyberspace. Determined Chinese nationals are still able to access this prohibited content. The
United States has prosecuted its citizens who have committed illegal acts in cyberspace even though
they were physically in another country when they connected to cyberspace. These boundaries are
not defining physical territory in cyberspace, but rather allowing sovereigns to exert control on their
citizens. They permit a sovereign to protect its citizens from prohibited information of one sort or
another, whether it is child pornography or democratic principles.
Like other global commons, cyberspace as we know it has value for all States. The Internet
and e-commerce have allowed business to occur around the world in an instant and have opened
hard-to-reach markets. Cyberspace has been a great equalizer between big and small States. It is in
the interest of most States for cyberspace and the Internet to exist as it is today. Unlike other global
commons, however, cyberspace needs regulations and policing, partly because of its accessibility to all
people.
Cyberspace is not naturally occurring and its architecture can be changed and is being
changed all the time, but the original design of the Internet, which allows packets to freely travel
from one point to another and automatically reroute to avoid traffic, must remain. The best analogy
compares cyberspace to the international straits of the sea. In order to continue the current functionality of the Internet, international law must acknowledge a right of transit passage in cyberspace.
This would actually be nothing more than establishing a State practice based on current norms. Citizens of one State violate the sovereignty of other States virtually every time they access the Internet.
Given the design of the Internet, an email sent from one person in State X to another person in State
X can transit States Y and Z in route. This State practice needs to be institutionalized.
International law in the other domains developed over time and technology developed to fit
the needs of States. Cyberspace is like no other domain. Although there is no way to control the flow
of electrons in cyberspace and maintain the functioning of the Internet as we know it today, there
are ways to control what content a person sees. A sovereign should be able to control the impact of
the content of the Internet on its people. But as a world, there is a need to keep the backbone of the
Internet alive. A right of transit passage would accomplish both objectives by allowing sovereigns to
regulate their national cyberspace, while at the same time permitting electrons to freely transit cyberspace.
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The UN Charter outlaws war, but States still continue to have armed conflicts. States utilize
every domain in these conflicts; there is no reason to believe the domain of cyberspace is any exception. Cyber warfare, however, may offer a way for States to battle without killing. If we are going to
have war, we should not discourage the use of cyberspace, which can reduce the kinetic effects of war.
Given the fact that cyberwar is possible, most scholars agree that the law of armed conflict should
apply in cyberspace.
Most States are currently conducting different types of cyber operations. With the growing acceptance of international law applying in cyberspace, law abiding States are worrying about
potentially violating another State's neutrality. Since electrons take the fastest route on the Internet,
a State cannot know whether a cyber operation will navigate through the cyberspace of a neutral
State en route to its destination. Most military operations can occur without worrying about the law
of neutrality since there is not an international armed conflict. The possibility of violating another
State's sovereignty, however, is still an issue. Unless there is a right of transit passage, a State needs the
permission of another State before its electrons transit through the other State's cyberspace. Since it
is currently impossible to control the path of an electron through cyberspace, 317 this is an infeasible
burden.
In an international armed conflict in cyberspace, the law of neutrality applies. Prior to evaluating the rights and obligations of neutrals and belligerents under the law of neutrality, the issue of
sovereignty must be addressed. If the electrons of one State cannot transit another State without violating that State's sovereignty, then the law of neutrality is irrelevant. If there is a right of transit passage in cyberspace, then international law can address the rights and responsibilities of a neutral State
under the law of neutrality. The law does not prohibit the electrons from a belligerent State from
transiting though a neutral State and it does not require a neutral State to stop these electrons from
transiting its cyberspace as long as it impartially allows all belligerents to use its cyber infrastructure.
No other interpretation of the law of neutrality is feasible in cyberspace. A fear of violating the law of
neutrality should not hinder State action in cyberspace.
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